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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Ishmael Abdullah pled guilty to two federal offenses, 
one for conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute heroin, and the other for being a felon in possession 
of a firearm.  When he was sentenced, the District Court 
concluded that he was subject to sentencing enhancements 
for, among other things, being a career offender under 
§ 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“U.S.S.G.” or “the guidelines”).  That conclusion was based 
in part on Abdullah’s 2015 conviction for third-degree 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under § 2C:12-
1(b)(2) of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated (“N.J.S.A.”).  
Abdullah now appeals his sentence, arguing that the career-
offender enhancement does not apply to him because his New 
Jersey conviction for third-degree aggravated assault is not a 
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“crime of violence” under the guidelines.  We disagree and, 
for the reasons that follow, will affirm the sentence. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
  
Abdullah was involved in a drug-trafficking organization that 
distributed heroin in New Jersey.  He was arrested by federal 
agents and charged in a two-count information with 
knowingly and intentionally conspiring to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and 21 
U.S.C. § 846, and with illegally possessing a firearm as a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He 
pled guilty to both counts.   
 
 In preparation for recommending how the guidelines 
should apply at sentencing, a probation officer prepared a 
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”).  The PSR reflected 
a base offense level of 28, after concluding that Abdullah had 
been supplied with, and was thus responsible for, at least 700 
grams of heroin.  The PSR then recited a number of 
enhancements and adjustments in calculating the total offense 
level.  One enhancement was for Abdullah’s career offender 
status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1,1 which was determined on the 
                                                 
1  Section 4B1.1(a), known as the career-offender 
enhancement, applies: 
 
if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years 
old at the time the defendant committed the 
instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant 
offense of conviction is a felony that is either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance 
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basis of two earlier felony convictions, one of which was a 
2015 conviction in New Jersey state court for third-degree 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,2 in violation of 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b)(2).3  Another adjustment was made 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for Abdullah’s role as an 
organizer or leader of a conspiracy that involved at least five 
participants.4  Abdullah objected to the attribution of at least 
                                                                                                             
 
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two 
prior felony convictions of either a crime of 
violence or a controlled substance offense. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  For statutory offenses carrying a 
maximum term of imprisonment of 25 years or more, the 
offense level must be at least 34, if the enhancement is to 
apply.  Id. § 4B1.1(b). 
 
2  The other was a 2010 conviction in New Jersey state 
court for the manufacture or distribution, or intent to 
manufacture or distribute, a controlled dangerous substance.   
 
3  That New Jersey statute provides that “[a] person is 
guilty of aggravated assault if he … [a]ttempts to cause or 
purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a 
deadly weapon[.]”  N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b)(2).  It is a crime of 
the third degree.  Id. § 2C:12-1(b). 
 
4 Section 3B1.1(a), known as the organizer-or-leader 
enhancement, states that a defendant’s offense level should be 
increased by four levels “[i]f the defendant was an organizer 
or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more 
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700 grams of heroin to him and to application of the 
organizer-or-leader and career-offender enhancements.   
 
At sentencing, he reiterated those objections and the 
District Court overruled them.  It concluded then and in a 
detailed post-hearing opinion that Abdullah was responsible 
for at least 700 grams of heroin and that application of the 
four-level organizer-or-leader enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) 
was appropriate.  It also determined that Abdullah’s 
conviction under N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b)(2) for third-degree 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon categorically 
qualified as a “crime of violence” under the guidelines.  Thus, 
the Court applied the career-offender enhancement as 
provided in § 4B1.1, which put Abdullah’s offense level at 
34.  After other adjustments for acceptance of responsibility, 
the total offense level was 31, and his criminal history 
category was VI.  The resulting recommended guidelines 
sentencing range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, two 
to five years of supervised release, and $30,000 to $5 million 
in fines.  The Court ultimately sentenced Abdullah to 176 
months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release on 
the controlled substance charge, and a concurrent 120 
months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release 
on the firearm charge.  It waived any fine but ordered him to 
forfeit his firearm and associated ammunition, and it imposed 
special assessments totaling $200.   
 
This timely appeal followed.   
 
                                                                                                             
 
participants or was otherwise extensive[.]”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.1(a). 
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II. DISCUSSION5 
 
Abdullah challenges his sentence on the same three 
grounds he pressed before the District Court: first, that he is 
not a career offender because his conviction under New 
Jersey law for third-degree aggravated assault does not 
categorically qualify as a crime of violence under the 
guidelines; second, that the organizer-or-leader enhancement 
does not apply to him; and third, that it was factually 
erroneous to hold him responsible for 700 grams or more of 
heroin.  None of those arguments is persuasive, but only the 
one regarding the career offender question needs 
consideration.  Because Abdullah is a career offender, his 
other sentencing complaints are of no consequence.6 
 
Under the guidelines, a defendant is a career offender 
if, among other things, he “has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled 
                                                 
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
6  “Whether a … conviction constitutes a crime of 
violence for purposes of the career offender [g]uideline is a 
question of law over which we exercise plenary review.”  
United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(first alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brown, 
765 F.3d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2014)). 
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substance offense.”7  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  In 2015, the 
guidelines defined a “crime of violence” as “any offense 
under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year, that[:]” 
 
(1)  has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another, or 
 
(2)  is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another. 
 
Id. § 4B1.2(a) (2015).  We refer to the first subsection as the 
“elements clause.”  The first part of the second subsection is 
the “enumerated offenses clause,” and the latter part of that 
subsection is the “residual clause.”  Our focus here is solely 
on the elements clause.8 
                                                 
7  There is no dispute that Abdullah’s 2010 drug 
conviction qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” for 
purposes of the career-offender enhancement. 
 
8  No one disputes that Abdullah’s third-degree 
aggravated assault conviction under New Jersey law is for an 
offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.  
See N.J.S.A. § 2C:43-6(a)(3) (stating that the term of 
imprisonment for a person convicted of a crime of the third 
degree “shall be between three years and five years”).  
Furthermore, because we ultimately conclude that Abdullah’s 
aggravated assault conviction is a crime of violence under the 
elements clause, we need not consider the applicability of 
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To determine whether a previous conviction is a 
predicate offense pursuant to the elements clause of the 
career-offender enhancement in § 4B1.2(a)(1), we must 
undertake what is called the “categorical approach,” which is 
an analysis comparing the guidelines’ definition of “crime of 
violence” to the elements of the statute under which the 
defendant was previously convicted.  United States v. Wilson, 
880 F.3d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2018).  “If the statute forming the 
basis of the defendant’s conviction necessarily has” as an 
element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against another person[,]” then that “statute proscribes a 
predicate crime of violence within the meaning of the 
[g]uidelines.”  United States v. Ramos, 892 F.3d 599, 606 (3d 
Cir. 2018). 
 
Under the categorical approach, we “ignore the actual 
manner in which the defendant committed the prior offense” 
and “presume that the defendant did so by engaging in no 
more than ‘the minimum conduct criminalized by the state 
statute.’”  Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 
191 (2013)). But, if the statute of conviction is divisible 
because it sets out alternative criminal offenses, we may 
apply what is called the “modified categorical approach.”  Id. 
at 606-08.  Under that approach, we are permitted to look 
beyond the statute of conviction to documents such as “the 
                                                                                                             
 
other clauses in the “crime of violence” definition.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015).  Thus, we do not need to 
analyze the government’s alternative argument that a 
conviction under New Jersey’s § 2C:12-1(b)(2) categorically 
qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause. 
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‘charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of 
plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial 
judgment to which the defendant assented’” to identify the 
specific statutory provision that served as the basis for the 
defendant’s earlier conviction.  Id. at 607 (quoting United 
States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005))).  
Once the specific provision is identified, the categorical 
approach is then applied to that provision. 
 
Therefore, whether Abdullah is a career offender 
requires us to address three questions.  See Ramos, 892 F.3d 
at 607.  First, is New Jersey’s aggravated assault statute 
divisible?  See id.  Second, if so, can we identify the specific 
subsection under which Abdullah was convicted?  See id.  
Finally, “if so, does that specific aggravated assault offense 
categorically qualify as a predicate crime of violence under 
the [g]uidelines?”  Id.  We answer yes to each of those 
questions and thus conclude that the career-offender 
enhancement applies. 
 
1. New Jersey’s Aggravated Assault Statute 
 Is Divisible 
 
The parties do not dispute that New Jersey’s 
aggravated assault statute, N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b),9 is 
                                                 
9  In 2015, § 2C:12-1(b) provided as follows: 
 
Aggravated assault. A person is guilty of 
aggravated assault if he: 
 
10 
 
                                                                                                             
 
(1) Attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, or causes such injury purposely or 
knowingly or under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life 
recklessly causes such injury; or 
 
(2) Attempts to cause or purposely or 
knowingly causes bodily injury to another with 
a deadly weapon; or 
 
(3) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon; or 
 
(4) Knowingly under circumstances manifesting 
extreme indifference to the value of human life 
points a firearm, as defined in section 2C:39-1f., 
at or in the direction of another, whether or not 
the actor believes it to be loaded; or 
 
(5) Commits a simple assault as defined in 
subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this section upon: 
 
[subsections omitted – listing 
classes of persons including, 
among others, law enforcement 
officers, emergency responders, 
educators, and judges]; or 
 
(6) Causes bodily injury to another person while 
fleeing or attempting to elude a law 
enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. 
11 
 
                                                                                                             
 
of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while operating a motor 
vehicle in violation of subsection c. of 
N.J.S.2C:20-10. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law to the contrary, a person shall 
be strictly liable for a violation of this 
subsection upon proof of a violation of 
subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 or while 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of 
subsection c. of N.J.S.2C:20-10 which resulted 
in bodily injury to another person; or 
 
(7) Attempts to cause significant bodily injury 
to another or causes significant bodily injury 
purposely or knowingly or, under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life recklessly causes such significant 
bodily injury; or 
 
(8) Causes bodily injury by knowingly or 
purposely starting a fire or causing an explosion 
in violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 which results in 
bodily injury to any emergency services 
personnel involved in fire suppression 
activities, rendering emergency medical 
services resulting from the fire or explosion or 
rescue operations, or rendering any necessary 
assistance at the scene of the fire or explosion, 
including any bodily injury sustained while 
responding to the scene of a reported fire or 
explosion. For purposes of this subsection, 
“emergency services personnel” shall include, 
12 
 
                                                                                                             
 
but not be limited to, any paid or volunteer 
fireman, any person engaged in emergency 
first-aid or medical services and any law 
enforcement officer. Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law to the contrary, a person shall 
be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph 
upon proof of a violation of N.J.S.2C:17-1 
which resulted in bodily injury to any 
emergency services personnel; or 
 
(9) Knowingly, under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life, points or displays a firearm, as 
defined in subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or 
in the direction of a law enforcement officer; or 
 
(10) Knowingly points, displays or uses an 
imitation firearm, as defined in subsection f. of 
N.J.S.2C:39-1, at or in the direction of a law 
enforcement officer with the purpose to 
intimidate, threaten or attempt to put the officer 
in fear of bodily injury or for any unlawful 
purpose; or 
 
(11) Uses or activates a laser sighting system or 
device, or a system or device which, in the 
manner used, would cause a reasonable person 
to believe that it is a laser sighting system or 
device, against a law enforcement officer acting 
in the performance of his duties while in 
uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority. 
13 
 
divisible.  To determine whether “an alternatively phrased 
statute” is divisible, we ask “whether its listed items are 
elements or means.”  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2256 (2016).  As we recently explained in another 
opinion applying the modified categorical approach, 
“[e]lements are the constituent parts of a criminal offense that 
a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict[,]” 
                                                                                                             
 
As used in this paragraph, “laser sighting 
system or device” means any system or device 
that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm 
and emits a laser light beam that is used to 
assist in the sight alignment or aiming of the 
firearm. 
 
Aggravated assault under subsections b. (1) and 
b. (6) is a crime of the second degree; under 
subsections b. (2), b. (7), b. (9) and b. (10) is a 
crime of the third degree; under subsections b. 
(3) and b. (4) is a crime of the fourth degree; 
and under subsection b. (5) is a crime of the 
third degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, 
otherwise it is a crime of the fourth degree. 
Aggravated assault under subsection b. (8) is a 
crime of the third degree if the victim suffers 
bodily injury; if the victim suffers significant 
bodily injury or serious bodily injury it is a 
crime of the second degree. Aggravated assault 
under subsection b. (11) is a crime of the third 
degree. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b) (2015). 
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while “[m]eans … are merely the factual ways that a criminal 
offense can be committed” and do not need to “be found by a 
jury[.]”  Ramos, 892 F.3d at 608.  A “statute on its face may 
resolve the issue[,]” such as “[i]f statutory alternatives carry 
different punishments,” which suggests those alternatives are 
elements, not means.  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 
Here, the New Jersey aggravated assault statute, 
§ 2C:12-1(b), is divisible on its face because it proscribes 
three alternative degrees of conduct, each subject to different 
maximum sentences.  See N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b) (classifying 
various subsections as crimes of either the second, third, or 
fourth degree); id. § 2C:43-6(a) (providing the different 
maximum terms of imprisonment for crimes of the second, 
third, and fourth degree).  The second-degree, third-degree, 
and fourth-degree aggravated assault offenses are thus 
separable forms of aggravated assault under New Jersey law. 
 
The statute is further divisible into a number of 
different third-degree aggravated assault offenses.  New 
Jersey used disjunctive language to establish alternative 
elements of third-degree aggravated assault, including 
subsection (b)(2).10  “[E]ach subsection … criminalizes 
different conduct and sets forth different (albeit overlapping) 
                                                 
10  Aggravated assault under subsections (b)(5) and 
(b)(8) are crimes of the third degree only if the victim 
suffered bodily injury.  N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1(b).  Also, we note 
that we are looking to the 2015 statute under which Abdullah 
was convicted rather than the current statute, which is 
identical in all material respects for purposes of this case.  
Compare id. § 2C:12-1(b) (2015), with id. § 2C:12-1(b) 
(2017) (adding subsections (b)(12) and (b)(13)). 
15 
 
elements that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Ramos, 892 F.3d at 609; see also New Jersey Model Jury 
Charges (Criminal), “Aggravated Assault” (N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-
1(b)) (detailing the different elements for various aggravated 
assault subsections).  Section 2C:12-1(b) is thus divisible and 
resort to the modified categorical approach is appropriate. 
 
2. Abdullah Was Convicted of Third-
Degree Aggravated Assault with a 
Deadly Weapon Pursuant to New 
Jersey’s § 2C:12-1(b)(2) 
 
The parties also agree that the specific third-degree 
aggravated assault subsection under which Abdullah was 
convicted is readily identifiable.  He pled guilty to third-
degree aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in violation 
of subsection (b)(2) of the statute, as stated in the PSR 
without objection, confirmed by the judgment of conviction, 
and admitted by Abdullah through counsel.  Under the 
modified categorical approach, then, it is established with 
certainty that the offense of conviction was the conduct 
proscribed by § 2C:12-1(b)(2) of the New Jersey Code. 
 
3. Third-Degree Aggravated Assault with a 
Deadly Weapon, in Violation of New 
Jersey’s § 2C:12-1(b)(2), Is a Crime of 
Violence 
 
The issue thus becomes whether a conviction under 
§ 2C:12-1(b)(2) is categorically a crime of violence under the 
guidelines.  More specifically, we must determine whether 
that subsection demands proof of “the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
16 
 
another,” as is required by the elements clause of the crime of 
violence definition in the guidelines.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).  
We agree with the District Court that it does. 
 
The term “physical force” has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court to mean “force capable of causing physical 
pain or injury to another person.”  Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 11  Thus, under § 4B1.2(a)(1) of the 
guidelines, a crime of violence is one that has as an element 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force capable of 
causing physical pain or injury to the person of another.  
Chapman, 866 F.3d 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2017).  “That remains 
true regardless of whether an offender could be convicted 
under the statute for applying force directly (e.g., hitting a 
victim with a bat) or applying force indirectly (e.g., throwing 
a brick at a victim).”  Ramos, 892 F.3d at 611 (citing 
Chapman, 866 F.3d at 132-33). 
 
Section 2C:12-1(b)(2) forbids “[a]ttempt[ing] to cause 
or purposely or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon[.]”  New Jersey law defines “bodily 
injury” as “physical pain, illness or any impairment of 
physical condition[,]” N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-1(a), and “deadly 
weapon” as “any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, 
material or substance … known to be[, or fashioned in a way 
that would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be,] 
                                                 
11  The Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) 
definition of “violent felony” is sufficiently similar to the 
guidelines’ definition of “crime of violence” that 
interpretations of one are generally applicable to the other.  
Chapman, 866 F.3d at 132 n.3 (citing United States v. 
Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
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capable of producing death or serious bodily injury[,]” id. 
§ 2C:11-1(c).  The minimum conduct sufficient to convict a 
defendant under § 2C:12-1(b)(2), then, is conduct attempting 
to cause any impairment of physical condition with an 
instrument or substance that, as fashioned, would lead the 
victim reasonably to believe it was capable of producing 
serious bodily injury.  “As a practical and legal matter, an 
offender can do so only by attempting to use physical force 
against another person.”  Ramos, 892 F.3d at 611.  In other 
words, as a matter of course, the minimum conduct that 
supports a conviction under § 2C:12-1(b)(2) inherently 
involves proving beyond a reasonable doubt an element of 
physical force that satisfies the elements clause of the “crime 
of violence” definition in the guidelines’ § 4B1.2(a)(1). 
 
That conclusion comports with our recent decision in 
United States v. Ramos, in which we considered a conviction 
under a Pennsylvania statute that is practically identical to the 
New Jersey statute at issue here.  892 F.3d at 610-12.  In 
Ramos, we said that a conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2702(a)(4), which criminalizes “attempt[ing] to cause or 
intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] bodily injury to another 
with a deadly weapon[,]” id. at 611 (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 2702(a)(4)), “is categorically a crime of violence under 
the elements clause of the [g]uidelines[,]” id. at 612.  We 
noted that that “conclusion is dictated by the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in United States v. Castleman[, 134 S. Ct. 
1405 (2014), in which] … the Supreme Court explained that a 
conviction under a statute proscribing ‘the knowing or 
intentional causation of bodily injury’ is a conviction that 
18 
 
‘necessarily involves the use of physical force.’”12  Id. at 611-
12 (quoting Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1414).  That explanation 
in Castleman was enough for us to conclude in Ramos that 
“aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which similarly 
requires proving the attempted, knowing, or intentional 
causation of bodily injury, is categorically a violent crime.”  
Id. at 612. 
 
Abdullah makes several arguments aimed at avoiding 
that logical conclusion.  First, he contends that, because the 
New Jersey legislature has distinguished between “bodily 
injury” and “use of force” in its criminal statutes, those two 
phrases must be understood as mutually exclusive.  (Opening 
Br. at 10.)  Specifically, because New Jersey makes a person 
                                                 
12  Although we have recently questioned whether the 
Supreme Court’s broad language in that regard holds true in 
all scenarios, see United States v. Mayo, 901 F.3d 218, __ , 
slip op. at 221-22 (3d Cir., Aug. 22, 2018) (citing and quoting 
United States v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) 
for the proposition that “Castleman does not support the 
[g]overnment’s argument that any form of bodily injury 
requires violent force”),  it certainly holds true and is binding 
upon us in situations expressly considered by the Supreme 
Court in Castleman (i.e., bodily injury resulting from a 
situation necessarily involving the affirmative use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force).  Although 
Castleman did not consider “[w]hether or not the causation of 
bodily injury necessarily entails violent force” because it only 
addressed common-law force, Castleman, 134 S. Ct. at 1413, 
we think the “deadly weapon” requirement in § 2C:12-1(b)(2) 
is enough to bridge any potential gap that may give cause for 
concern. 
19 
 
“guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he 
… [i]nflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another[,]” in 
Chapter 15 of its criminal code, its use of the words “bodily 
injury” in Chapter 12 was a purposeful attempt to exclude the 
use of force from the definition of third-degree aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon.  (Opening Br. at 10 (quoting 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:15-1(a)(1))).  That speculation about legislative 
intent, however, fails to undercut the force of our reasoning in 
Ramos that the causation of bodily injury, or threat thereof, 
with a deadly weapon necessarily entails a use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of violent physical force.  Ramos, 892 F.3d 
at 612. 
 
Second, Abdullah cites a number of non-precedential 
district court cases for the argument that “‘bodily injury,’ as 
compared to ‘serious bodily injury’ and ‘significant bodily 
injury’,” is insufficient to satisfy the physical force required 
in the definition of “crime of violence” under the guidelines.  
(Opening Br. at 13.)  Relying particularly on United States v. 
Knight, No. 15-004, 2016 WL 223701 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2016), 
he contends that “mere ‘physical discomfort, or a sensation 
caused by a kick’ is sufficient bodily injury for purposes of 
proving assault under the New Jersey statute[, but is 
insufficient] to qualify as ‘serious bodily injury’ under the 
federal generic definition.”  Id. at *6 n.6.  Assuming without 
deciding that that were true, Abdullah ignores that the court in 
Knight was analyzing aggravated assault under a different 
provision, § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), and that the bodily injury 
referenced in § 2C:12-1(b)(2), the provision that is at issue 
here, must have been caused or attempted “with a deadly 
weapon[.]”  That kind of injury naturally involves the use, 
attempted use, or threat to use the type of violent physical 
force contemplated by the guidelines’ definition of “crime of 
20 
 
violence.”  See Ramos, 892 F.3d at 612 (noting that it 
stretches the imagination to think “a person could knowingly 
or intentionally injure, or attempt to injure, another person 
with a deadly weapon without engaging in at least some 
affirmative, forceful conduct”). 
 
Finally, Abdullah argues that the conclusion in Ramos 
with respect to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon 
under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(4) cannot be extended to 
the New Jersey statutory provision at issue here.  He says 
that, “whereas Pennsylvania’s definition of a deadly weapon 
is strictly subjective to the perpetrator …, New Jersey’s 
‘deadly weapon’ can alternatively be subjective to the 
victim[.]”  (Opening Br. at 15-16.)  He points to no authority, 
though, and we can find none, suggesting that merely because 
one takes the perspective of the victim rather than of the 
defendant, the use of a deadly weapon to cause or attempt to 
cause bodily injury does not involve at least a threat of violent 
physical force.  Cf. Damaso-Mendoza v. Holder, 653 F.3d 
1245, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011) (“There is a threatened use of 
physical force against the person … of another whether the 
object used by the perpetrator is a true deadly weapon or just 
looks like one.” (citation, emphasis, and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  To the extent Abdullah argues that the New 
Jersey statute criminalizes conduct using a mens rea 
requirement less than that necessary for generic aggravated 
assault because the focus is placed on the victim’s state of 
mind rather than the defendant’s state of mind with respect to 
the deadly weapon element, we disagree.  Section 2C:12-
1(b)(2) requires proving that the defendant purposely or 
knowingly used an instrument or substance in a way that 
“would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable 
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of producing death or serious bodily injury[.]”13  N.J.S.A. 
§ 2C:11-1(c). 
 
At the end of the day, “it is [still] nearly impossible to 
conceive of a scenario in which a person could knowingly or 
intentionally injure, or attempt to injure, another person with 
a deadly weapon without engaging in at least some 
affirmative, forceful conduct.”  Ramos, 892 F.3d at 612.  We 
therefore hold that a conviction for third-degree aggravated 
assault with a deadly weapon under New Jersey law, § 2C:12-
1(b)(2), is categorically a crime of violence under the 
elements clause of the guidelines.14  That means Abdullah’s 
                                                 
13  Abdullah also relies on the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States 
v. Martinez-Flores, 720 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2013), for its 
“detailed and relevant analysis of the New Jersey legislature’s 
intent in drafting its aggravated assault statute.”  (Opening Br. 
at 19.)  That case is inapposite because it addressed a 
different aggravated assault provision (i.e., N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-
1(b)(7)), under a different clause (i.e., the enumerated 
offenses clause), of a different guideline (i.e., U.S.S.G. 
§ 2L1.2).  Martinez-Flores, 720 F.3d at 295, 300.  Nor is his 
reliance on our decision in United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 
789 (3d Cir. 2005), helpful.  In that case, we addressed a 
provision in New Jersey’s sexual assault statute, N.J.S.A. 
§ 2C:14-2(c)(2), Remoi, 404 F.3d at 793, not a provision in 
New Jersey’s aggravated assault statute, let alone one that 
involves the use of a deadly weapon. 
 
14  Because we do not conclude that N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-
1(b)(2) is ambiguous, we need not consider Abdullah’s 
argument that the rule of lenity applies.  See United States v. 
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conviction under that statute qualifies as a crime of violence 
and the career-offender enhancement is applicable.  We thus 
affirm the District Court’s decision to apply it. 
 
Abdullah also argues that the District Court erred 
when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that at least 
700 grams of heroin were attributable to him, which set his 
base offense level at 28, and that he was an organizer or 
leader of the drug-trafficking organization, which raised his 
offense level by four points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).  
Those issues are moot, however, because we have concluded 
that the career-offender enhancement applies.  Even if four 
points were subtracted from his offense level due to an 
alleged error in calculating the drug quantity and another four 
were subtracted for misapplication of the organizer-or-leader 
enhancement, Abdullah’s final offense level would remain 
unaffected because the career-offender enhancement requires 
that his minimum offense level be 34.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.1(b) (instructing that a career offender facing a 
statutory maximum term of imprisonment of 25 years or more 
must be given an offense level of at least 34).  We therefore 
need not consider those arguments.  See PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 
F.2d 306, 309 (3d Cir. 1974) (noting that resolution of some 
issues in an appeal can moot other issues that were raised); 
see also Wilson, 880 F.3d at 88 n.11 (stating that the threat-
of-death sentencing enhancement did not need to be 
                                                                                                             
 
Savani, 733 F.3d 56, 66 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that the rule of 
lenity applies to the sentencing guidelines only when “there is 
a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute’” (quoting 
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010))). 
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considered in light of the holding with respect to the career-
offender enhancement). 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence 
imposed by the District Court. 
 
 
